Thoughts on Plato’s Phaedrus

The following is the result of an initial conversation a friend and I had on the Phaedrus several months ago ...



Preliminaries:
In a Platonic dialogue, the author does not give us his views directly. Plato does not present his philosophy by means of a treatise, but a new, philosophically inspired dramatic form: the “dialogue”. In order to understand what the dialogue teaches us, we must pay attention to the dramatic elements that frame the individual speeches:
– the title;
– the characters involved;
– the narrative form: whether mediated (narrated / diegetic) or unmediated (performed / mimetic); and
– the setting.

Some schools of thought would also begin by understanding the place of the dialogue within a set of supposedly connected dialogues, called a trilogy or a tetralogy -- see Bernard Suzanne's site on the Phaedrus as within a set of dialogues on the soul:
– Symposium (on the cause or driving force of the soul: eros)
– Phaedrus (on the nature of the soul: eros-logos)
– Republic (on the behaviour of the soul: justice)
– Phaedo (on the destiny of the soul: Being)

The title in question is that of one of the interlocutors: Phaedrus, a young, attrac tive, Athenian youth. We know Phaedrus from a couple of Plato’s other dialogues, most notabl y, the Symposium. In that dialogue, he is the “father of the logos”, or originator of the round of speeches. It is he who suggests that everyone present speeches in praise of the god Eros. None of the poets has presented an adequate praise of Eros, according to Phaedrus. A f ew things should be noted about this topic at the outset:
– Phaedrus is somehow acutely concerned with Eros, which he considers a god.
– Socrates’ speech in the Symposium in praise of eros does not call it a god.
– The subtitle of the Phaedrus is on Eros – making the kinship with the them e of the speeches in the Symposium explicit.

This confluence of character and of theme should point the reader to a kinship between the two dialogues; however, there are also some important differences:
– The Phaedrus is a “performed” dialogue. In a performed dialogue the characters speak their parts directly; there are no narrative cues, such as “he said in shame”. In the performed dialogue, the author almost completely effaces himself. On the other hand, the Symposium is a doubly mediated dialogue: it is a tale narrated by Apollodorus based on an occurrence that was told to him by Aristodemus. With the Phaedrus, we seem to be privileged with an immediate relation to the events of the dialogue; with the Symposium, on the other hand, we seem to have hearsay about events that were otherwise supposed to have remained secret.
– The setting of the Symposium is the house of Agathon within Athens. In the Phaedrus, Socrates is lured outside the walls of the city; the dialogue proper takes place by a river, in the shade of trees. It is the only dialogue in which Socrates is depicted outside of the walls of the city. In every dialogue, Socrates is somehow outside the limits of the city inasmuch as he questions its standards; however, in the Phaedrus, Socrates’ transcendence of the limits of the political is figured forth by the natural, mythically charged setting.
– The Phaedrus includes Socrates and Phaedrus as the only characters. It is the most private setting possible. During the banquet presented in the Symposium, there are 7 characters who speak, as well as a few others who are silent. Also, there are a few characters who speak during the narrative prologue to the description of the banquet. The Symposium takes place within a private setting; however, there are enough characters present that one cannot be sure if one’s words might not be made public at a later date – as they are by Apollodorus by means of Aristodemus.

The Question of Eros:
Despite the differences listed above, the two dialogues are akin in terms of the central question of the speeches presented: that is, the question of eros. This concern links the two dialogues, in a different way, to another dialogue: the Republic.
– In the Republic, eros is that which must be banished, monitored or moderated.
– Early in Book 1, Cephalus says he is glad to grow old because it has freed him from his mad master (eros).
– In the city in speech constructed by Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus, there are three orders that correspond to the three orders of the soul: the desiring part (epithumia), the spirited part (thumos), and the reasoning part (logismos). The desiring part of the soul corresponds to the class of labourers and money-makers. It is the part of the soul, like the part of the state to which it corresponds, that must be ruled by the spirited part.
– The ruling classes in that city would also have no attachments to property or to family members – that is, to “one’s own”. Their ultimate concern would be the state. This, and the assumption that men and women are essentially the same, rests on an abstraction from eros and from the body.
– Finally, the discussion of the least just regime, tyranny, presents the tyrannical individual as eros incarnate.
– It would seem that eros is ultimately incompatible with the essential limits of the political – and that, given the focus of the Republic, that dialogue can’t shed light on the question of eros as posed in the Symposium or the Phaedrus.

However, the Republic does provide some valuable insights into the nature of eros:
– The centre of the dialogue concerns the nature of the philosopher, that highest type of individual who would be the most rightful ruler of the political, but who would only choose to rule in, or by means of, the “city in speech”. The philosopher is the ruler of the city through his speeches, not by means of political action per se. In this way, the philosopher, as does Socrates, stays at the limits of the political.
– At the limits of the political, eros presents itself as central. The philosopher is described as a “lover” – one who, like all lovers, loves the whole of his beloved object, not just this or that part.
– The philosopher loves the whole of wisdom, not just the wisdom of this or that community. The philosopher is drawn, in an erotic fashion, to beings as a whole.
– This philosophic desire transcends the other desires: the spirited desire for honour and victory possessed by the warriors and the desire for physical pleasures or for wealth possessed by the money-makers.
– Thus, eros is essential to the individual as individual, as opposed to the individual as a member of a group; also, it has several dimensions, the highest of which is the philosophic eros.

Lysias’ Speech:
It is Lysias’ speech, and the promise of hearing it recounted by Phaedrus that lures Socrates out of the city. Phaedrus has tried to memorize the speech. This points to a difference between sophistic rhetoric and philosophic rhetoric that will be expanded upon later: the sophistic approach involves the memorization of certain words, tricks, phrases – not a philosophic engagement with the nature of the soul and with the essence of the words and approaches to be used.

Socrates ultimately discerns that Phaedrus has a written copy of the speech itself hidden under his cloak. Rather than listen to Phaedrus’s recollection of the speech, Socrates will listen to the speech as written, since it presents “Lysias himself.”

Lysias’ speech is an exemplary instance of the type of sophistry for which Socrates himself was accused by many Athenians. The oldest charge of such sophistry arises in Aristophanes’ The Clouds. In that play, Socrates is portrayed as a natural philosopher, studying the bowels of a gnat; he is also portrayed as a Sophist – that is, he is able to make the unjust or weaker argument defeat the just or stronger argument; in addition, he teaches the young how to achieve this for a fee. Ultimately, Socrates is shown as one who is oblivious to his political surroundings and as one who is not able to sway the many – Strepsiades ultimately burns down the Thinkery; Socrates is not able to assuage the anger of the members of the city. Aristophanes seems to say that this would be poetry’s claim to wisdom: its ability to sway the many. Poetry is able to sway the many because poetic wisdom consists of a knowledge and bringing forth of the passions (eros) of the soul – passions which are not brought forth within the confines of political discourse.

Lysias plays the role of the Sophist in Plato’s dialogue. Lysias’ speech makes the case for the weaker side of the argument. In matters of love, it would seem to be only common sense that the lover is to be preferred over the non-lover. Lysias argues the opposite.
– Lysias’ praise of the non-lover is the opposite of what Phaedrus seeks in the Symposium: a praise of love – it is not responsive to its audience.
– As Socrates later points out, Lysias’ argument is repetitive and lacks a proper structure.

Socrates’ First Two Speeches:
Socrates responds by making a better speech. Rather than deny the charge that Socrates is a Sophist, it seems to affirm it by saying that he is, in fact, the greatest Sophist – able to argue any side of an argument, regardless of the truth of the matter.
– Socrates’ defence of the non-lover is deemed better than Lysias; it seems that the battle is over and Socrates victorious.

However, Socrates is prevented from leaving by his “divine sign”. Had he left he would have sinned against love. He must now present the contrary speech, as repentance to love and as a replacement of his earlier, sinful speech.

The second speech takes up Lysias’ claim that love is madness, but says it is a divine madness – as opposed to a human madness.
– This should be compared with the image of the freed prisoner in the cave allegory who returns to the cave. He too is perceived by the many still trapped in the cave as mad. His madness, caused by having come from a more heavenly place to one that is darker, is to be opposed to the madness or blindness of those stumbling upward from darkness to the light.

The Image of the Chariot:
Socrates next turns to a discussion of the soul. Somehow the question of the nature of eros leads to the nature of the soul – somehow eros is essential to the nature of the soul.

Socrates begins by demonstrating that the soul is immortal – it is an unmoved mover. He begins by discussing the soul in terms of logos or reasoned argument; however, he does not stop there; he proceeds to discuss the soul in terms of an image (mythos).
– The soul is a chariot: with a driver (reason), a pure horse (spirit, thumos) and an impure horse (earthly desire). This tripartite distinction maps onto the parts of the soul as discussed in the Republic.
– The chariot follows the processions of the gods. This procession leads to the realm beyond the heavens – to that of truth (the forms of all things).
– The soul, weighed down by its impure horse, can at best only catch a glimpse of this realm. The soul can, when the impure horse gains too much sway, lose its wings and descend to earth – to live in 10,000 years choosing different lives, until it regenerates its wings. Successive philosophic lives shorten this span to 3,000 years.

The Myth of the Chariot seems to be needed to bring forth the nature of the soul:
– It is not a question, perhaps, of mythos versus logos, but of two different types of bringing forth.
– Or, myth could still be seen as denigrated by Plato, and used here by Socrates merely as a way of speaking to the superstitious Phaedrus.

The Question of Logos:
It is Lysias’ speech, and the promise of hearing it recounted by Phaedrus that lures Socrates out of the city. Socrates says he is a “lover of speeches”; it is this manic desire to hear speeches that pulls him away from his normal surroundings. Normally, he would learn about things by means of the speeches of men in the city. His ultimate turn from the study of nature as it is in itself to a study of things as revealed in speeches is recounted in the Phaedo (cf. 96-99).
– There he says that he had been a natural philosopher, but that the study of things themselves ultimately led to indeterminacy: distinctions as basic as which person is taller or shorter can ultimately be questioned when we gaze upon the phenomena in a questioning mode.
– This way to the truth he likens to staring at an eclipse of the sun: it is blinding in that the things seem to occult the shining source of their truth and being. We should note here that in the image of the Sun in the Republic, the Good as the source of the being and truth of things is likened to the sun.
– Socrates took a “second sailing” on his way to the truth of things, he says, by turning to the discourses (logoi).

A “discourse” (logos) is an account in language. For the Greeks, this making of accounts is the defining feature that makes one human as such. They defined the human in his essence as zoon logon echon. We often translate this as “the rational animal.” However, this point of departure takes for granted an “un-Greek” understanding of logos. It takes for granted an understanding of logos as “reason,” as tied to “logic.” Logos originally comes from legein, which means “to speak”, but also “to gather” such that what is gathered is brought together into an articulated unity. In this sense we could say that the Greek definition, rather than pointing to the human as the rational or logical animal, defines the human as the animal able to gather the disparate phenomena of existence into a meaningful unity or whole and to articulate the meaning of that unity – in short, the animal able to make accounts.

Each account, as a gathering, is partial. Its essential limitations are brought into relief through the dialogic conflict with other accounts.
– The discourse of Lysias on eros has definite limits, but certain elements are retained in the later discussions: i.e., love is a type of madness.
– This procedure is also evident during the discussion of various accounts of Justice in Book 1 of the Republic. Socrates finds limitations with Polemarchus’ account of Justice as harming one’s enemy and helping one’s friends. However, aspects of this account are retained in the discussion of Justice in relation to the nature of the Guardians: they will hate what and who they do not know and will love those who they know.

True and False Speech-making:
After discussing the nature of the soul, Socrates turns to the question of what is proper when it comes to making speeches. Here, he will more fundamentally distinguish between his mode of speeches and that of the Sophists such as Lysias.
– The sophistic method does not look to the truth of the matter and to what is best for the soul; rather, it involves the memorization of linguistic tricks with the aim of winning the argument.
– Philosophic rhetoric involves a study of the different types of soul and of the types of speech best suited to it.
– Sophistry is akin to one who does not know medical science, does not know the nature of the body, but can follow a prescription or a recipe; philosophic rhetoric is akin to the one who knows the nature of the body and can properly diagnose the cure.

This distinction would presumably be demonstrated in the earlier speeches on love:
– Lysias did not know Phaedrus’ true nature and did not gear his speech accordingly; whereas Socrates did gear his speech to Phaedrus.
– Socrates speaks in different ways to different people.

This leads to Socrates’ critique of writing:
– For Socrates written discourse is dead:

• it says the same thing to all people; it cannot respond to the situation and to the nature of the souls of the audience;
• in addition, it cannot respond to questions posed by these different audiences.
  

– However, as Derrida has shown in, to my mind, his greatest work, "Plato's Pharmacy" in the collection Dissemination, many of the images and the language of the text of the dialogue seem to place this dead, written substitute in the forefront – for instance, as noted above, Socrates in fact prefers the written speech of Lysias to an oral recollection of it – it makes Lysias present somehow (see also Tim Spurgin's summary and commentary on Derrida's essay).
– More basically, we may ask ourselves, why would Plato write dialogues if he truly held to the Socratic critique of writing?

Plato somehow found an approach to writing that avoids the defects pointed out by Socrates.
– Plato’s writing somehow says different things to different audiences. We may say that this fact is due to the esoteric character of his works.
– In order to avoid the Socratic charge, Plato’s writing must be alive, not dead.

• Plato’s writing can only be alive to the extent that it is responsive to the souls of the audience – its readers. It is responsive in that is says different things to different people and in that the Platonic dialogue, if responded to authentically by the audience, effects a transformation upon the soul of the reader;
• In addition, Plato's writing must be receptive to different questions -- it must be receptive to different interpretations.
  

In order to say different things to different audiences, Plato marries the way of philosophical inquiry with the way of the rhetorician or poet:
– This is a uniting of the ways of Socrates and Thrasymachus.
– This is a uniting of the inquiry into the nature of things with the ability to sway the many.
– If the wisdom of the philosopher consists of its questioning of the nature of things, the wisdom of the poet consists of his knowledge of the passions of the human soul. Plato combines the wisdom of the philosopher with the wisdom of the poet.

For Nietzsche, Plato’s poetic swaying of the many in the direction of his philosophically inspired vision meant that he was the only genuine philosopher within the Western tradition:
– The genuine philosopher is a legislator: one who forges the values of the community and moulds human character. Nietzsche makes this point most clearly in Beyond Good and Evil (a good discussion of Nietzsche's relation to Plato on this front can be found in Laurence Lampert's Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, at GoogleBooks, as well as his Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil.